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Abstract—Failure probabilities for grid components are often
estimated using parametric models which can capitalize on oper-
ational grid data. This work formulates a Bayesian hierarchical
framework designed to integrate data and domain expertise to
understand the failure properties of a regional power system,
where variability in the expected performance of individual
components gives rise to failure processes that are heterogeneous
and uncertain. We use Bayesian methods to fit failure models
to failure data generated in simulation. We test our algorithm
by evaluating differences between the data-generating model, our
Bayesian hierarchical model, and maximum likelihood parameter
estimates. We evaluate how well each model can approximate
the failure properties of individual components, and of the
system overall. Finally, we define an upgrade policy for achieving
targeted reductions in risk exposure, and compare the magnitude
of upgrades recommended by each model.
Index Terms—Electric power systems; Risk assessment; Risk
thresholds; Hierarchical modeling; Fragility curves; Uncertainty
estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Millions of individual components make up electric power
systems; each of these has a finite operating life time. Grid
components are subjected to physical force, chemical pro-
cesses, and operational stress that can give rise to failure.
Grid hardening and preventative maintenance can mitigate
the risk of unexpected failures, but risk reduction measures
can negatively impact cost and even performance. High-
fidelity models for representing failure processes in electric
power systems can provide insights valuable to a number of
resource allocation decisions, including system upgrades [1],
component stockpiling [2], and disaster response [3].
The current work presents a framework for probabilistically
modeling the risk that components will fail when exposed to
stress. This work provides a basis for leveraging grid data to
detect and quantify unmitigated vulnerabilities in operational
power systems, and to inform upgrade decisions. We explore
challenges that arise when using machine learning methods
to characterize failure properties of real-world systems. These
challenges include heterogeneous performance characteristics
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of individual components (e.g., due to differences in state-of-
health), and sparse observational data of past failure events.
The contributions of this work are twofold:
First, we propose a Bayesian hierarchical framework
for capitalizing on data and domain expertise to model
component-level and system-wide failure properties. Our for-
mulation captures the stochastic and heterogeneous nature of
failure processes by assuming model parameters are uncertain
and random. Accounting for this randomness provides insight
into the range of outcomes that could occur in light of the un-
certainty that exists. This feature makes our model particularly
well-suited to examining the possibility of low-probability,
high-impact risk scenarios that may not be evidenced in past
data. Applications could include scenario analysis of evolving
risks due to climate change, including wildfires and severe
weather events.
Second, we formulate a mathematical model for optimizing
component upgrades to achieve specified risk thresholds. This
policy capitalizes on uncertainty in the failure parameters of
the system for insight into the performance characteristics of
existing components. We describe how decision-makers can
apply these insights to identify the subset of components with
the highest probability of failure, thus minimizing the number
of upgrades needed to achieve risk reduction goals.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II we
contextualize our work within the existing literature. Section
III motivates the use of Bayesian hierarchical models in
power systems, and describes our model formulation. Sec-
tion IV describes methods for parameter estimation, model
selection, and model evaluation–and formulates the optimal
upgrade policy. Section V compares the parameters, statistical
properties, and decision-making implications of our model
with alternative models for systems exhibiting a range of
failure properties. Section VI presents concluding remarks and
outlines opportunities for future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A number of studies in the literature examines failure
properties of regional power systems during extreme events.
Some of these studies use prescriptive failure models to
inform probabilistic models for assessing risk and weighing
upgrade policies in simulation [1], [4], [5]. Other studies mine
failure data from past events to characterize vulnerabilities in
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operational power networks, for example to cascading failures
[6], hurricanes [7] and earthquakes [8].
A separate body of literature focuses on estimating the
probability that individual components will fail when exposed
to certain ambient or operating conditions. It is conventional
to use parametric failure models (or “fragility curves”) to
describe these failure probabilities; [9] provides a survey
of models and methods that are typically used. In power
systems, standard failure models are available [10], and a
number of studies report models characterizing failures that
occurred under severe conditions such as hurricanes [7], [11]
and earthquakes [8].
The literature also suggests, however, that failure properties
are not the same for all grid components. For example, [12]
and [13] mine existing data to characterize differences in
failure probabilities based on what is known about components
that failed in the past. However, grid data are often noisy and
sparse, and the degradation mechanisms that give rise to failure
may be costly (if not impossible) to monitor [10].
These studies underscore two critical research needs. First,
there is a need to better understand failure properties of grid
components in light of the fact that grid data can be sparse,
noisy, costly, and inaccurate (see [13]). Second, there is a
need to examine if or how uncertainty in component-level
failure models could change how we understand the risk of
low-probability high-impact events.
III. MODEL FORMULATION
Here, we formulate a Bayesian hierarchical model to char-
acterize failure properties of grid components in a regional
power system. We begin by providing philosophical and
mathematical context on Bayesian hierarchical models, and
discuss why they are uniquely well-suited to the application
at hand. We go on to describe the functional form of the
models we use to characterize failure probabilities for individ-
ual grid components, and draw a mathematical link between
component-level failure probabilities and system-wide failure
of regional power systems under stress.
A. Bayesian Hierarchical Model
Hierarchical models provide a basis for characterizing sys-
tems where the relationship between the input and output vari-
ables is probabilistic and uncertain. The model is structured
as a multi-level hierarchy where the last level describes some
probabilistic process whose outcome is conditioned on the
outcomes at previous levels in the hierarchy. Thus levels of
the model describe uncertainty in the outcome, in the data, in
the system of equations relating the inputs to the outputs.
To formalize this mathematically, let us consider a system
where the output of the system y is related to some input x
by a given model Mθ(x) with parameters θ, such that
y = Mθ(x) (1)
If the input x is a realization of some random variable X , then
the output Y is also a random variable which is conditionally
dependent on X . The probability of observing a particular set
of outcomes P (x, y) can be written
P (x, y) = P (y|θ, x) P (x) (2)
where the outcome y depends on the realization of x that was
observed, and on the parameters θ given. This formulation can
be extended to account for additional sources of uncertainty,
for example in how the system is parameterized.
Hierarchical models capitalize on this structure of condi-
tional probabilities to characterize the likelihood that a partic-
ular parameterization is correct, in light of the observations x
and y available to us. Inherent to this approach is the notion
that parameter estimates can only be as definitive as the data
that are available to compute them. When the data are sparse,
or when the mapping of X onto Y is imprecise (e.g., due to
measurement noise, or unobservable system dynamics), then
parameter estimates will be uncertain.
To demonstrate this mathematically, we return to (2) above.
Suppose we wish to estimate the probability P (θ|x, y), or the
distribution of unknown parameters θ, given an observation of
x and y. The Bayesian formulation is as follows:
P (θ|x, y) = P (θ) P (x, y|θ)
P (x, y)
(3)
Here, P (θ) is the prior, which allows us to incorporate expert
judgement into our calculation P (θ|x, y) (i.e., the posterior)
in addition to the data x and y. Here, the term P (x, y|θ) is the
“likelihood function” describing the probability of observing
the data (x, y) given a particular estimate of the parameters.
Finally, the denominator P (x, y) is the likelihood of observing
the data independent of the parameters. Using the law of total
probability, we can rewrite the denominator as
P (x, y) =
∫
θ′∈Θ
P (x, y|θ′)P (θ′)dθ′ (4)
This quantity is the “normalizing constant” and generally
cannot be computed analytically. Instead, we use Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods (described in Section IV-A) to
compute the posterior numerically.
B. Component Fragility Curves
Fragility curves are commonly used in reliability engi-
neering to describe the probability that a system will fail
when exposed to different magnitudes of stress. These curves
provide a quantitative basis for evaluating how vulnerable a
system is to different modes of stress, and to stress conditions
that are rarely (if ever) observed in practice. We refer readers
to [9] for a detailed overview of fragility analysis.
We use a generalized linear model with a logistic link
function relating the stress input conditions X to failure
occurrence. We define g(x) to be the probability that a par-
ticular component will fail, given stress conditions x, written
mathematically as
g(x) = P (“component fails”|x)
=
1
1 + exp [−∑pi=1 βi(xi − αi)] (5)
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Here xi is a vector of time series observations for a particular
stress condition. Elsewhere in the text, we refer to X—a p-
dimensional matrix of measurement data. The thresholds αi
describe the ability of the system to withstand mild to moder-
ate stress conditions. The coefficients βi describe how quickly
the failure probability increases as stress conditions approach
(and exceed) the threshold αi. These thresholds and slopes
parameterize the failure mechanics of the system, providing a
probabilistic relationship between the stress conditions X and
failures. We refer to the parameters collectively as θ.
C. System-Wide Failure Properties
Here, we extend the component-level failure model in (5) to
model system-wide failure. Power systems are designed and
operated to be resilient to the loss of one or two components.
However, losing additional components can cause the system
to become inoperable, even when only a small fraction of
components are affected. Since the ambient conditions that
give rise to failures (e.g., storms, heat waves, etc.) typically
occur over a time-span of hours to days, the probability that
any one specific component will be lost to the system is small
(component lifespans are typically on the order of decades).
At the component level, failure occurrence is a binary
random variable, and can be modeled as a Bernoulli process
with failure probability g(x) (see Section III-B). It follows that
from a systems perspective, the overall number of failures Y
can be modeled as a sequence of Bernoulli trials. The number
of trials is simply equal to the number of components in
the system N , and Y follows a Binomial distribution where
Y ∼ Binomial(N × g(x)).
The Poisson limit theorem tells us that if N is large, a
Binomial random variable can be approximated by a Poisson
process with rate λ = N × g(x). The probably of observing
a particular number of failures y is
P (y) = e−N×g(x)
(N × g(x))y
y!
(6)
To put this in words: the system-wide failure process Y can be
approximated by a Poisson process, where the rate is related
to the failure probabilities of the components in the system as
specified in (5).
Having formalized the failure probability distributions, we
revisit our description of the model Mθ(x). We define Mθ
to be a function mapping ambient conditions x ∈ Rp onto a
random variable Y describing the number of failures in the
system. The variable Y is an inhomogenous Poisson process;
the observed failures y are a realization of Y . Mathematically,
Mθ(x) is defined as:
Mθ : x 7→ Y (7)
Y ∼ Poisson
(
N
1 + exp [
∑p
i=1−βi(xi − αi)]
)
(8)
IV. ANALYSIS METHODS
Fig. 1 provides a visual overview of the framework we
use to fit and evaluate our Bayesian hierarchical model.
The following paragraphs provide details about methods for
Fig. 1. Block diagram illustrating analysis procedure.
estimating parameters given a candidate model M iθ(x), for
choosing the best model M∗θ (x) from a library of options
Mθ(x), and for benchmarking the performance of our model
against others.
A. Parameter Estimation
We use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to
compute the posterior distribution of the parameters θ.
MCMC encompasses a category of algorithms that ap-
proximate an unknown probability distribution by sampling
candidate values from some proposed distribution, and then
updates the proposed distribution at each iteration. Updates are
made according to some rule based on the likelihood function.
In our case, we examine the likelihood of the data given a
candidate set of parameters θ∗, given by P (x, y|θ∗).
Different MCMC algorithms use different rules for updating
the sampling distribution of θ∗ at each iteration. However,
these rules are all designed such that the sampling distribution
asymptotically converges to a target distribution. Convergence
is achieved either by updating the sampling distribution at each
iteration, or using rejection sampling. We use the common
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm [14] which relies on rejection
sampling. We refer readers to [15] and [16] for details on
implementation.
At each iteration k, updated parameters θ∗ are proposed
according to the following rule:
θ∗ = θk + z (9)
where z is a random perturbation sampled from a multivariate
normal distribution.
As the chain advances, the parameters θk+1 are set equal
to θ∗ if certain acceptance criteria are satisfied. If the criteria
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are not met, the new parameters are rejected and the current
parameters are kept (i.e., θk+1 is set equal to θk). The
acceptance rule is given as follows:
P (accept) = min
{
1,
P (θ∗|y)
P (θk|y)
}
(10)
In words: if the likelihood of the new parameters P (θ∗|y)
exceeds the likelihood of the current parameters P (θk|y), the
update is accepted. If the proposal decreases the likelihood
function, then the update is accepted with some probability
equal to the ratio between the two likelihoods.
We use empirical methods to generate the prior and to de-
termine the correlation structure of Z: the so-called “jumping
distribution”. We do so by computing maximum likelihood
parameter estimates θˆ for bootstrapped sub-samples of the
data. We then adjust the covariance of Z by some scalar value
to achieve an acceptance rate of 0.25 to ensure that the Markov
chain exhibits desirable convergence properties [16].
B. Model Selection
We use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to weigh
different parametric models Mθ(x) based on parsimony and
fit. Mathematically, the BIC is given by:
BICMiθ(x) = −2 log
(
`Miθ
)
+K log(n) (11)
Here, `Miθ describes the likelihood that a particular model
M iθ(x) describes the data, K is the number of features in
the model, and n is the number of observations in the data.
The likelihood is calculated by taking the total probability of
the model across all candidate parameterizations θ′, given by
`Mθ =
∫
θ′∈Θ
P (x, y|Mθ, θ′)P (θ′)dθ′ (12)
The BIC describes the information contents of one model
compared with another. Thus, we choose the model that
minimizes the BIC, and compare the information contents of
different models based on the differences between the BIC
for one model compared with the model selected. We refer
readers to [17] for a comparison of BIC and other metrics for
model selection.
C. Evaluating Model Performance
Here, we describe metrics for evaluating how accurately the
model learned from data recovers the true model.
In real-world systems, the true model would be unknown.
In simulation, however, we have specified the true model in
order to generate the data y. We capitalize on the fact that
the failure model is known to evaluate the performance of
our Bayesian hierarchical model. We evaluate the performance
of our model by examining how accurately it represents the
statistical properties of the system (measured using the K-L
divergence), and in terms of its ability to recommend suitable
upgrade policies.
1) Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence: KL divergence is an
information theoretic metric describing the statistical distance
between two distributions, given by:
DKL(P ||Q) =
∫
y∈Y
P (y) [log (P (y))− log (Q(y))] dy
(13)
Here P (y) is the probability of observing y failures given the
true distribution of θ
P (y) =
∫
x∈X
∫
θ∈Θ
P (y|x, θ)P (x)P (θ) dθ dx (14)
while Q(y) is the probability of observing y failures given the
distribution of θˆ approximated using MCMC.
2) Optimal Upgrade Policy: Next, we examine upgrade
policies that a decision-maker would arrive at using the
proposed model, compared with the true model. The objective
of the upgrade policy is to identify the minimum number
of components that must be be upgraded to achieve a target
distribution of acceptable failure rates.
We define the target distribution P (Y˜ ) such that the proba-
bility that Y˜ failures exceeds some specified damage threshold
δ must be below a specified probability :
P
(
Y˜ > δ
)
≤  (15)
P
(
Y˜ > δ
)
= 1−
δ∑
y˜=0
P (Y˜ = y˜) (16)
where P (Y˜ = y˜) is given by (6). For example, the policy
could be to upgrade the system such that damages exceeding
> 1% of components are expected to happen no more than
once every 100 years.
The optimal policy finds the minimum number of com-
ponents M that must be upgraded to achieve the target
distribution P (Y˜ ). Upgrade decisions modify the parameters
θi of individual components, thus changing the distribution of
parameters in the overall system P (θ˜).
In Section III, we introduce the notion that uncertainty in
the parameters of the system stems from variability in the
parameters of individual components. The implication is that
the distribution P (θ) provides meaningful insight into the
failure probabilities of individual components, and that the
optimal upgrade policy would target the subset of components
that are at highest risk of failure (given x). Though the failure
parameters of individual components may not be known,
exogenous information about the age or state-of-health of
individual components are often available. We assume that
decision makers can capitalize on these data to accurately
assess the relative performance of one component verses
another.
We consider an upgrade policy where upgrades increase the
threshold parameters α, focusing on a particular case study
where upgrade decisions would increase the wind speed rating
of poles. The optimal upgrade policy for such a measure is
depicted graphically in Fig. 2. Thus the target distribution P (θ˜)
is simply a truncation of the original distribution P (θ), where
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Fig. 2. Illustrative diagram showing failure parameters for components
targeted for upgrades. The number of components is given by (17). The
threshold τ is obtained by solving (15).
upgrades are targeted to replace components with relatively
lower failure thresholds.
The optimization objective is to identify the truncation
threshold τ . Mathematically, we can compute τ by numerically
solving the following:
 ≥ 1−
δ∑
y=0
∫
x∈X
∫ ∞
θ=τ
P (y˜|x, θ)P (x)P (θ) dθ dx (17)
As presented here, this formulation assumes that the failure
probability of upgraded components is zero.
We assume that the parameters of upgraded components are
modified such that the failure probability becomes negligible.
Once τ is known, the optimal number of components to
upgrade can be computed from the integral:
M = N
∫ τ
0
P (θ) dθ (18)
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Here, we present results from a series of tests designed
to evaluate how accurately the Bayesian Hierarchical model
(BHM) detailed in Section III and IV approximates failure
processes representative of real power systems.
We train a model using synthetic failure data generated
in simulation, where the parameters of the failure model
are specified. In the following paragraphs, we outline our
procedure for generating the data, and describe the char-
acteristics of the failure processes we examine. We report
results of the parameter estimation, model selection, and model
evaluation procedures described in Section IV. Where relevant,
we compare results against the true model used to generate
the data, and with a model trained using traditional maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE), as described in [9].
A. Data Generation
We generate synthetic failure data by defining a failure
model that relates ambient conditions x to the random variable
Y . Data are generated from a model where x is a vector of
wind speed measurements. For x we use 10-years of hourly
weather data recorded at a site in Northern California to
represent stress conditions on the system.
Given the weather conditions at each time step and the
specified failure model M ′θ(x), we compute the failure prob-
ability g(x) using (7). From these component-level failure
Fig. 3. Probability density of threshold parameter α for different failure model
specifications. Here, θ describes the wind speed (in m/s) at which the failure
probability g(x) is 0.5.
probabilities we generate a realization y of the number of
failures in the system overall. The random variable Y follows
the Poisson distribution specified in (6).
B. Experimental Design
We test our method given failure processes that exhibit a
range of statistical properties.
First, we examine cases where components are increasingly
robust to failure. Because the probability P (x) decreases
as ambient conditions x become increasingly severe, robust
performance can be represented by increasing the parameter α
in (5). Failure models are challenging to learn for components
that are robust to failure because as P (x > α) decreases,
the probability of observing failure events becomes small.
We examine cases where P (α) is normally distributed and
is centered around three wind speed thresholds (65, 70, and
75 m/s), as depicted in Fig. 3.
Next, we examine cases where failure properties of different
components in the system exhibit varying degrees of hetero-
geneity. We represent heterogeneity by increasing the coef-
ficient of variation (COV) in failure parameters, or the ratio
between the standard deviation and the mean. A higher COV
indicates more variability in the performance characteristics of
individual components.
We execute parameter estimation, model selection, and
model evaluation using the methods discussed in Section IV
for each of the models specified. We evaluate how well our
model compares with the true model. We also compare against
a model of the same functional form as the selected model
M∗θ (x) that uses maximum likelihood estimation to estimate
the parameters of the model (rather than using MCMC to
estimate the posterior). That is, M∗θ (x) estimates scalar values
for the parameters as opposed to probability distributions.
C. Results and Discussion
Here, we summarize results for each of the failure condi-
tions specified above. We use the BIC to select the functional
form of M∗θ (x) from candidate models where failures are
correlated with only wind speed, or both wind speed and
precipitation. In all of the cases we consider, we find that
minimizing the BIC results in selecting the correct model.
Next, we focus our analysis on examining estimates of
the threshold parameter α in particular, where α describes
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Fig. 4. Violin plot showing range and distribution of true values, and BHM
and MLE estimates of α. Horizontal lines denote the mean of the true
distribution E [α]. From left to right, the COV for parameters in each panel
are 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3.
COV=0 COV=0.1 COV=0.2 COV=0.3
E [α] = 65 0.201 0.201 0.203 0.206
E [α] = 70 0.201 0.201 0.199 0.197
E [α] = 75 0.239 0.232 0.220 0.199
TABLE I
ESTIMATED WIND SPEED COEFFICIENT β FOR BHM AND MLE MODELS.
IN THE TRUE MODEL, β IS ALWAYS 0.2.
the wind speed x at which g(x) equals 0.5. The following
paragraphs examine the magnitude and distribution of the
parameter estimates fitted to failure data generated for each of
the specified failure models. We also report the K-L divergence
and upgrade policy, as defined in Section IV.
1) Parameter Estimates: Fig. 4 shows the range and distri-
bution of α for the true model, and for the BHM and MLE
approximations. Both the BHM and MLE models produce
mean values within < 5% of the true value when the true mean
E [α] is 65 and 70 m/s, and within < 10% when the true mean
is 75 m/s. However, in all cases the parameter distributions
are systematically lower than the true mean. This difference
increases in cases where the variance is high.
This result suggests that parameter estimates are systemati-
cally baised. The reason for this bias is that the probability of
observing damaging wind speed conditions is higher when the
threshold α is low. It follows that the incidence of failures is
relatively higher among components with small α than among
components with high α. The implication is that parameter
estimates are more heavily influenced by a relatively small
subset of components that particularly prone to failure.
The estimated coefficients β for each case are listed in Table
I. In our model, the coefficients are taken to be constant and are
equal to 0.2. BHM estimates report very narrow uncertainty
bounds on slope parameter estimates. We note that in cases
when the wind speed threshold is high, β tends to decrease
as the COV increases. This result has implications on upgrade
decisions, as discussed in detail below.
2) K-L Divergence: Fig. 5 shows the statistical distance
between the true and estimated probabilities P (Y ) (top) and
g(x) (bottom), as given by (13). The true distribution is omit-
ted, as the distance is by definition zero. The K-L divergence
is computed by taking the integral across all parameter values
Fig. 5. Statistical distance between the true distribution P (Y ) and estimated
distribution P (Yˆ ) of failures to the system (top), and between the true
failure probability g(x) and estimated failure probability gˆ(x) of individual
components.
θ ∈ Θ (as indicated in (14)), and can be thought of as a metric
of error in the underlying probability distributions.
Results show that there is little difference between the BHM
and MLE models compared with the true model. When the
mean threshold is 65 or 70 m/s, the divergence increases as
heterogeneity among parameters increases. This result does
not hold when the threshold is 75 m/s, though it is unclear to
what extent this result is driven by the particular realization
of failures y that occurred.
At the component level, the divergence is consistently
negative–indicating that both the BHM and MLE models
under-represent component-level failure probabilities. This re-
sult is consistent with the previous observation that both
models under-estimate the threshold parameter α. When the
failure threshold is high, the statistical error in component-
level failure models is high, though error in the distribution
of failures in the system overall may be low. Future work
will explore how sensitive these results are to the particular
realization of failures y that occurred.
3) Upgrade Policy: Finally, we compare differences in
upgrade decisions informed by the true model, and by BHM
and MLE parameter estimates. We use the upgrade model
detailed in Section IV-C2, where the risk tolerance is defined
as follows:
P (Y > 0.1N) ≤ 0.05 (19)
In words, our objective is to limit the probability that > 10%
of components will be damaged (i.e., δ = 0.1N ); we aim to
limit the probability to below 5% (i.e.,  = 0.05).
From (17), it is clear that upgrades are related not only to
the failure model, but also to the ambient conditions x. Here,
we take Y to be the total number of failures in a year, and
take P (x) to be a log-normal distribution fitted to 10 years of
historic data.
Fig. 6 summarizes the number of upgrades necessary to
achieve this risk target for each of the cases we consider.
We also show the threshold τ that defines the subset of
components targeted for upgrades. Systems where P (α) is
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Fig. 6. Percentage of components recommended for upgrade.
centered around 65 or 70 m/s do not meet the specified
risk target given the wind speed conditions that are present,
and the model recommends substantial upgrades to achieve
the specified risk threshold. On the other hand, when P (α)
is centered around 75 m/s, the system is overbuilt–and no
components are targeted for upgrades.
In general, the BHM formulation outperforms the MLE
model in recommending upgrades that are less aggressive and
are more closely aligned with the true model. The reason is
that by representing variability in the failure parameters of
the components, the BHM can more accurately represent the
fact that the benefits to the system are higher when upgrade
policies target components with the highest failure probability.
Errors in upgrade policies informed by the BHM and
MLE models tend to favor more aggressive upgrades than
are necessary. This result is consistent with our previous
result that these models systematically underestimate the mean
threshold α. What is less intuitive is the observation that both
models recommend aggressive upgrade policies in the case
where E [α] is 75 m/s and the variance is high. Returning to
Table I, we can see that estimates of β are lower in these
systems. One consequence of underestimating β is that the
failure probability g(x) increases for x < α. In other words,
underestimating β causes us to overstate the risk of failures
under mild ambient conditions, resulting in an unnecessarily
aggressive upgrade policy.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper outlines a Bayesian hierarchical modeling frame-
work designed to capitalize on grid data of historic failures to
characterize failure probabilities and inform upgrade decisions.
We train our model on synthetic failure data generated from
specified failure models, and benchmark our results against
both the true model and against a model fitted using the
maximum likelihood estimation.
When we assume that components exhibit heterogeneous
failure properties, we find that our model tends to systemat-
ically under-represent variability relative to the true model.
Furthermore, we find that bias in the failures recorded in
the data leads to systematic bias in the parameters of both
Bayesian and maximum likelihood approximations.
This finding suggests a critical flaw in current best-practices
for evaluating risk in electric power systems, and motivates
the need for future work. One opportunity to advance the
work would explore sampling techniques–such as stratified
MCMC sampling or importance sampling–which can adjust
for known bias in the sampling distribution of the data (as the
Metropolis Hastings algorithm does not). Another opportunity
is to explore the value of information that could help to more
precisely determine the failure properties of components that
do (or do not) pose a risk, in light of the sampling bias that
exists.
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